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Abstractʊ The content of this paper will illustrate how, in the 
future, the power transmission system in Great Britain (GB) may 
EH PXFK ³ZHDNHU´ WKDQ LW LV DW SUHVHQW DQG ZLOO GHVFULEH WKH
potential impact that this could have on the voltage profiles 
during faults, and how the operation of backup protection system 
operation, if required, needs to be considered carefully to ensure 
system integrity in the future. The potential for future problems 
associated with generators¶, converter-interfaced infeeds¶, and 
HVDC LQWHUFRQQHFWRUV¶ potential LQDELOLW\ WR ³ULGH WKURXJK´
during slow/backup protection operations, and the consequent 
risk of complete system collapse, will also be highlighted. The 
paper also contains a description of ongoing and future work 
concerned with investigation of the use of wide-area 
communications systems, which may already be in existence and 
used for other purposes, to enhance backup protection 
performance and possibly offer an alternative and improved 
solution compared with existing schemes. It is shown how such a 
system could potentially EH ³VHWWLQJV-IUHH´ DQG HVWDEOLVK DQG
maintain an image of the connectivity of the network from either 
SCADA data and/or analysing current flows during normal 
operation. Example results of simulations are included to 
demonstrate the concept of identifying fault locations and 
protection failures using measured voltages from phasor 
measurement units (PMUs). This may act as a foundation for a 
future backup protection scheme and this is discussed in the 
conclusions and future work sections. 
Index Terms² Backup, Communications, IP/MPLS, Phasor 
measurement, Protection, System strength 
I. INTRODUCTION 
2QHYLHZRIWKHFRQFHSWRI³Vystem strength´FRXOGEHWKH
general ability of the entire power system network to remain 
stable following disturbances. Fault level is one of the most 
important indicators of system strength. With increasing 
amounts of converter-interfaced generation (particularly non-
synchronous generation), individual source fault infeeds and 
consequently, overall system fault levels, may decrease 
significantly in future, potentially compromising system 
strength. The reduction of short circuit level will also lead to 
wider and deeper voltage depressions during and after faults, 
possibly compromising the operation of certain types of system 
protection and increasing challenges associated with low 
voltage ride through capability for all generators, HVDC 
interconnectors and embedded HVDC links. 
As shown in Fig. 1, it is anticipated that the fault levels in 
GB will decline significantly, even for the ³1R3URJUHVVLRQ´
scenario [1]. For the ³*RQH *UHHQ´ VFHQDULR UHGXFWLRQs in 
short circuit level range from 35% to 70% reductions from 
present values, largely as a result of decommissioning of 
synchronous machines and introduction of converter-
interfaced sources and infeeds. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Short circuit decline 2025/26 vs 2015/16 levels [1] 
 
According to Fig. 2, for a three-phase fault at Walpole 400 
kV substation cleared in 140 ms (the slowest assumed main 
protection clearance time), the voltage depression is much 
wider for 2025 than that for 2015 ± it is clear that almost the 
entire countries of England and Wales would see the impact of 
this transmission system fault.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Voltage map for fault at 400 kV Walpole substation in 2025 [1] 
  
If, under D IXWXUH ³ZHDNHU V\VWHP´ VFHQDULR WKH main 
protection was to fail, then existing backup protection, which 
operates with approximately 500 ms time delay (although 
circuit breaker fail may operate faster than this), could clearly 
lead to ride through problems for generators and HVDC links. 
Ride-through for HVDC systems and all transmission-
connected generation is usually only stipulated with respect to 
assumed 140 ms to 250 ms main protection clearance times 
[2]). This could be even more challenging in the future due to 
more severe and widespread voltage depressions in a weaker 
system (as shown in Fig. 2). In such a scenario, although highly 
unlikely to occur in the first place, the risk of complete system 
collapse cannot be discounted. In the European context, codes 
and recommendations for generators and HVDC interfaces 
have recently been issued [2] to define how generators should 
behave during faults and in terms of their ride through 
capability ± although specific codes must be defined for each 
QDWLRQDO V\VWHP RSHUDWRU WR PHHW WKHLU RZQ V\VWHP¶V
requirements.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:  existing 
backup protection arrangements are reviewed briefly in section 
II; section III reviews PMUs and selected applications; 
simulation results and analysis relating to the proposed PMU-
based scheme for fault identification/location are presented in 
section IV; and IP/MPLS, a potential communications 
mechanism for the proposed scheme, is introduced in Section 
V. Conclusions and future are summarised at the end of the 
paper. 
 
II.  EXISTING TRANSMISSION SYSTEM BACKUP PROTECTION  
A. Distance protection  
Distance protection is used to provide both primary and 
remote backup protection in transmission networks. It operates 
by calculating the apparent impedance from measurements of 
voltage and current and uses this data to identify faults and 
their approximate locations [3] and subsequently take tripping 
action (with various time delays dependent on the fault 
location) [4]. 
Normally, distance protection consists of an instantaneous 
(Zone 1) and several time-delayed zones (Zone 2, Zone 3«) 
to provide remote backup protection [5]. A diagram illustrating 
typical zones of protection is shown in Fig. 3.  
In actual applications, distance protection may have up to six 
zones (such as reverse zone 3 to provide backup for busbar 
IDXOWV³EHKLQG´WKHUHOD\LQJORFDWLRQ. 
 
 
 
The advantage of backup distance protection is that coverage 
of the protected line section is independent of internal 
impedance of the source (i.e. it is theoretically independent of 
fault level) and no communication system is required (although 
sometimes communications is used to enhance performance). 
The disadvantages of distance backup protection are the 
potential nuisance tripping of zone 3, which could (and has in 
the past) cause cascading outages, and the relatively slow 
operation (typically 400-500ms) of zone 2 which may 
challenge low voltage ride through capability of generators, 
particularly in the future if during-fault voltage depressions are 
more severe and widespread as shown earlier in this paper. 
B. Overcurrent protection 
Overcurrent protection is normally used to provide remote 
backup protection for transmission networks. For 400 kV and 
275 kV transmission lines, with maximum fault levels of 63 
kA (per phase) at 400 kV and 40 kA at 275 kV, the backup 
overcurrent protection operation time is at least 1 s for a three 
phase fault at the remote end of the protected section [6].  
The advantage of overcurrent protection as backup 
protection in transmission level is cheap and again does not 
require communication systems to function. The main 
disadvantage is that it may be influenced by changes in fault 
levels (e.g. in very weak systems it may not operate, or operate 
more slowly than it should) and it is relatively slow-acting. 
C. Circuit breaker fail protection  
Circuit breaker fail (CBF) protection is extensively used as 
a local backup protection scheme which provides a relatively 
faster and more secure means of backup protection than 
alternative network protection-based methods. If a circuit 
breaker does not operate in a predetermined period of time after 
receiving a tripping signal from relay, the CBF will detect the 
flow of current (indicating that the main breaker has not 
operated) and trip all adjacent circuit breakers required to 
effect clearance of the persisting fault  [7]. Lockout relays are 
used to prevent reclosing of circuit breakers tripped by CBF. 
For transmission networks in GB, the clearance time of CBF 
is typically 300 ms [6]. The advantage of CBF is that it is faster 
and more secure than network protection backup schemes. 
However, this comes at a cost associated with additional 
hardware, wiring, in some cases communications, complexity 
and requirements to maintain the schemes ± and modify them 
if the network is extended or changed in the future.    
 
III. PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNITS (PMUS) 
A. Principles 
PMU provides real-time measurements of magnitude and 
phase of voltage and current. PMU data (or derived data from 
PMUs) may include positive sequence voltages and currents, 
individual phase voltage and currents, local frequency and 
ROCOF (rate of change of frequency) and many other 
quantities which can be used in wide area monitoring, control 
and protection schemes. Using accurate time synchronisation 
at the point of measurement from the GPS (global positioning 
system) clock, signals from geographically-separate locations Fig. 3. Diagram of zones and elements of the system protected [5] 
  
can be compared accurately using PMUs and wide-area 
communication systems [8]. 
B. Overview of PMU applications 
Wide area measuring system (WAMS) is one of the most 
common applications of PMUs in power systems. WAMS can 
be used to improve the speed of measurement and accuracy of 
information provided for functions such as state estimation [9].  
A typical WAMS structure is shown in Fig. 4. Typically, many 
PMUs are connected to PDCs (phasor data concentrators) via 
communication networks. The PDCs collect, analyse and sort 
the incoming data from PMUs. The processed data from PDCs 
can be exchanged between PDCs and then sent to local 
applications or higher level control system for further 
concentration or analysis of the data [10]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. A schema of PMU/ WAMS 
As already mentioned, PMUs can potentially improve the 
speed and accuracy of state estimation functions, as proposed 
in [11], where a system to monitor the voltage security in 
distribution systems is described. An application of PMU-
based wide area monitoring and control in the Chinese 110 kV 
distribution networks is presented in [12]. 
  Wide area protection and control schemes based on 
WAMS and communication systems have been proposed. For 
example, a wide area differential backup protection is studied 
in [13]. A novel architecture for integrated wide area protection 
and control is proposed in [14]. The number of applications of 
PMUs is expected to grow in the future as confidence in and 
adoption of the technology grows.  
 
IV. INTERNET PROTOCOL / MULTIPROTOCOL LABEL 
SWITCHING (IP/MPLS) 
In order to include PMU data from a wide area as part of a 
fast and cost-effective backup protection scheme, it is critical 
that a high-performance communication system is used, ideally 
with high bandwidth, high security, low latency and low levels 
of jitter. Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) over 
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) or Synchronous Optical 
Network (SONET) has traditionally been used in transmission 
network control and protection applications [15]. The 
advantage of TDM is primarily through its inherent high levels 
of reliability and availability ± it can switch upon failure to 
alternative communications paths in less than 50ms. However, 
the disadvantage is inflexibility and inefficiency as bandwidth 
is reserved for specific functions [15]. 
IP/MPLS is a relatively new option for transmission 
networks. It can potentially support both existing TDM and 
new IP and Ethernet applications such as wide area protection. 
The security and reliability levels are not compromised using 
IP/MPLS: the fast reroute feature (FRR) provides recovery 
times for link or node failures of less than 50ms. IP/MPLS 
solutions are relatively cheap. It is promising as an enabler for 
wide area protection schemes.  
V.  PMU-BASED, VOLTAGE-ONLY METHOD OF FAULT 
LOCATION 
A. Overview 
The proposed backup protection scheme is assumed to 
operate using an image of the network connectivity, which can 
be maintained at a central/regional level using SCADA or 
potentially observed current flows gathered from SCADA or 
PMUs. Using this network model, when a fault is detected 
XVLQJ GHWHFWHG YROWDJH GLSV DQG ³VWHSV´ IURP 308V DV
outlined later), then the location (in terms of the faulted line) 
of the fault can be detected. If, following a time delay, the 
measured voltages indicate that the fault has not been cleared 
and that a main protection scheme (or circuit breaker) has 
failed, then tripping commands to the appropriate circuit 
breakers (using the aforementioned image of network 
connectivity to determine which breakers must be tripped) 
could be sent.  This is still at the concept stage ± the following 
sections of the paper focus on demonstrating the feasibility of 
using PMUs to identify the faulted feeder (and the protection 
that has failed).  
B. Power system model 
  A single-line diagram of the power system model used in 
this study is shown in Fig. 5. The 3-bus system is based on an 
actual section of the 400 kV transmission network in GB and 
the fault levels have been set to minimum levels in accordance 
with [16] to represent a relatively weak system of the future. 
The model has been created using Simpowersystems. The fault 
locations are shown in Fig. 5. All faults are three phase to earth 
faults. 
The voltage magnitude at each busbar is measured by a P 
class, 10 kHz PMU model, which reports output every 20 ms 
(once per cycle). This reporting rate is why the results in the 
figures later in the paper seems to suggest step changes in 
voltage, as opposed to ramped changes (which are the case in 
reality), but due to the once-per-cycle PMU reporting rate, they 
appear as step changes. The PMU model was created by 
researchers at the University of Strathclyde [17]. 
 
  
 
Fig. 5. Single line diagram of the model
 
C. Simulation results for faults at various locations 
Each type of fault simulated has two groups of results. The 
first is under the assumption of no operation of any of the main 
protections at both end lines (case A). This is of course 
extremely unlikely but should be considered. The second 
scenario is perhaps more realistic (although still relatively 
unlikely) and assumes operation of only one of the line-end 
main protections and failure of the other (case B). All faults are 
applied at 0.5 s within the simulation and, in cases where one 
of the main protections is assumed to operate correctly, the 
correctly-operating relay and circuit breaker act to clear the 
fault 80 ms after the initial fault occurrence. 
 Faults close up to single connection busbar (F1 and F6) 
The simulation results of case A for F1 is shown in Fig. 6. 
The black, red and blue traces show the voltage magnitudes 
measured at busbars 1, 2 and 3 (V1, V2 and V3). It can be seen 
from the graph that the magnitudes of V1 and V2 are much 
smaller than that of V3 (both are less than 60% of nominal) 
which can be used to deduce that the location of the fault is 
definitely between busbar 1 and busbar 2. The results of case 
A for F6 is similar. 
It is clear that the voltage remains depressed at all locations 
as it is assumed in this case that both line-end main protections 
have failed (subsequent backup operation is not simulated). 
   
 
Fig. 6. Simulation results of case A for F1 ± both line-end main protection 
fail 
 
 
The simulation results for case B are summarised in Table 1 
for F1 and F6. In these cases, the voltage at one end of the 
faulted line will ³Vtep´ up when the main protection at that line- 
end operates correctly, with the other end assumed failed. For 
operation of relays protecting circuits at busbar 2, two voltages 
will step up upon circuit breaker opening; e.g. for F4, if the 
circuit breaker controlled by R3 opens, both V1 and V2 will step 
up. For operation of relays remote from busbar 2 (e.g. at 
busbars 1 and 3), only one voltage will step up; e.g. for F4, if 
the circuit breaker controlled by R4 opens, only V3 ZLOO³VWHS
XS´.  
It can be observed that, for all fault positions, the voltage 
measured at one busbar will always behave differently from 
the others, and therefore, when only one protection/circuit 
breaker fails to operate, the measured voltages and subsequent 
step ups can always be used to identify the faulted feeder (and, 
by implication, the failed protection). 
Table 1ˊ Summary of case B  
Fault 
location 
Relay operation V1 
Step 
V2 
Step 
V3 
Step 
Identified 
fault 
location 
R1 R2 R3 R4 
F1 Ĝ h - - Ĝ h h R1 ± R2 
h Ĝ - - h Ĝ Ĝ R1 ± R2 
F6 - - Ĝ h Ĝ Ĝ h R3 ± R4 
- - h Ĝ h h Ĝ R3 ± R4 
 
 Faults in the middle of transmission line (F2 and F5) 
As the simultaneous failure of all main protection schemes 
at both line ends is deemed virtually impossible in practice, the 
remaining simulations focus only on situations where the main 
protections at one line end have failed, with the other line end 
protection operating correctly. Fig. 7 shows one simulation 
result of case B for F2 as an example. 
The simulation results of case B be are summarised in Table 
2. As before, similar patterns of voltage and subsequent step 
ups can be used to determine the faulted feeder and failed 
protection system(s). This information would then be used (in 
the backup protection system that will be developed in future) 
to send trip signals to the appropriate circuit breakers to clear 
the fault. 
  
 
Fig. 7. Simulation results of case B for F2 ± only R2 fails 
Table 2. Summary of case B 
Fault 
location 
Relay operation V1 
Step 
V2 
Step 
V3 
Step 
Identified 
fault 
location 
R1 R2 R3 R4 
F2 Ĝ h - - Ĝ h h R1 ± R2 
h Ĝ - - h Ĝ Ĝ R1 ± R2 
F5 - - Ĝ h Ĝ Ĝ h R3 ± R4 
- - h Ĝ h h Ĝ R3 ± R4 
 
 Faults close up to multiple connection busbar (F3 and F4) 
The simulation results of case B for F3 and F4 are shown in 
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 respectively, with main protection at one line 
end assumed to have failed. As these fault locations are very 
close to each other, located 1% from the end of different lines 
connected to the same busbar, then the initial magnitude of all 
measured voltages in these two scenarios are almost identical. 
V2 collapses to a value close to 0 for both faults, as they are 
very close to busbar 2. V1 and V3 have values of approximately 
0.5 p.u. during the fault (before any circuit breakers open), 
which makes it very difficult to determine whether the fault is 
on one line or the other in this case from initial examination of 
voltages. However, when one of the main protections operates, 
then, as for the previous cases, the fault location (F3 or F4) can 
be known as the protection at the one end of the line will have 
tripped the breaker and the voltage at this location will step up.  
 
Fig. 8. Simulation results of case B for F3 ± only R2 fails 
 
Fig. 9. Simulation results of case B for F4 - only R4 fails 
 
The simulation results of case B be can summarised in Table 
3. Similar to the results shown in sections A and B, for 
operation of relays at busbar 2, two voltages will step up when 
one of the line-end main protections operates and for operation 
of relays remote from busbar 2, only one voltage will step up.  
Table 3. Summary of case B 
Fault 
location 
Relay operation V1 
Step 
V2 
Step 
V3 
Step 
Identified 
fault 
location 
R1 R2 R3 R4 
F3 Ĝ h - - Ĝ h h R1 ± R2 
h Ĝ - - h Ĝ Ĝ R1 ± R2 
F4 - - Ĝ h Ĝ Ĝ h R3 ± R4 
- - h Ĝ h h Ĝ R3 ± R4 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has demonstrated the concept of a new method 
for identification of fault location for the purposes of backup 
protection. The method is based solely on analysis of 
distributed voltage magnitude measurements from PMUs. It 
has been shown how, using said measurements, the position of 
faults can always be determined from observations of voltage 
depressions and the subsequent voltage step ups at specific 
location(s). The case where there are multiple failures of 
protection systems or circuit breakers at several locations may 
be more difficult for faults at certain locations (e.g. very close 
to line ends), but the authors believe such scenarios to be highly 
unlikely, although these scenarios will still be investigated.  
In order to move forward to the implementation and full 
investigation of the efficacy of the scheme, a number of further 
investigations and developments are needed: the method of 
gathering PMU data, including the associated communications 
infrastructure, must be determined; a software-based 
implementation of the fault identification methods must be 
developed and tested; simulations of more complex and 
realistic power systems must be conducting, including testing 
the operation of the system with resistive faults and when the 
fault levels in the system vary; implementation and testing 
using RTDS and other hardware in the laboratory. All of this 
  
represents future work that the authors will be undertaking as 
this project progresses.  
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